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in parallels between Greek primary education and our own. For the aim and object of our primary schools, as expounded in the Code itself and by educationalists like Professor Sadler, are definitely Greek—the training of character and the formation of good citizens. It is to the primary school, therefore, rather than to the public school (where the training of character is not so directly an object and citizenship is not so definitely inculcated) that one naturally turns for a parallel to the primary education of the Greeks; the more, as our primary education, just like that of the Greeks, stops at the age of fourteen. But a wider experience and greater reading would no doubt have enabled the author to do these things, and yet more, as he advanced in the study of his subject. As it is, the book remains, in spite of these slight criticisms, *κομψόν τι καὶ ἐνυρθμον*.

In a work for which such scholars as Mr. Morshead and Mr. Cornford stand joint sponsors, it would be hard to detect any errors. One such is the statement (p. 23) that “the Dorians can claim the ethical and collectivist philosophy of Pythagoras;” for Pythagoras was an Ionian, and had not, in any real sense, a philosophy, such philosophy as one understands by the term Pythagoreanism belonging to the later Pythagoreans.

ERNEST BARKER.

Oxford.

NEW WORLDS FOR OLD. By H. G. Wells. London: Constable & Co., 1908. Pp. 355.

Readers of Mr. Wells's former works, imaginative or speculative, will find here, not perhaps more in the way of direct practical suggestion, but more of the spirit of compromise with present reality, than in anything he has previously attempted. His work is indeed intended as a popular introduction to a practical socialism. On the whole, his romances prefigure the critical part of this, while its reconstructive part is prefigured in his series of utopias. To me the former part is the more impressive. In direct criticism here, as in imaginative suggestion elsewhere, Mr. Wells shows himself undoubtedly a powerful analyst of the existing order of society. A certain intellectual affinity with the mechanical side of it, derived from scientific training, makes the destructive effect of his analysis all the stronger. Probably no one can exaggerate effectively for an

imaginative purpose something in which he has no sympathetic interest. In Mr. Wells's representation of his Martian monsters I seem to perceive an element of underlying respect for the power of those highly efficient instrumental or mechanical intelligences placed momentarily at the summit of things and draining the life out of humanity. Whether "The War of the Worlds" was intended as an allegory I do not know, though the remark in the present volume (p. 93) that "the idea of property has run wild and become a choking universal weed" recalls an incident in that book. But that the nightmares of "The Time Machine" and "When the Sleeper Wakes" were definitely elaborated as conceivable developments of the industrial plutocracy in which we live there can be no doubt. In the last stage of the process, nemesis has come, and the parts are reversed. We get, as M. Anatole France has epigrammatically summed it up, "an anthropophagous proletariat and a comestible aristocracy." And now, in the opening part of Mr. Wells's new volume, he gives us a perfectly sober criticism showing forth the utter irrationality of the selective process as it is allowed to go on in modern societies dominated by the concentration of wealth as an aim.

So far the socialist's case is complete. The question then arises, ought all of us who desire to emerge from the present economic order to call ourselves socialists? According to Mr. Wells, we ought if we are logical. The alternative is between socialism and definitive plutocracy. If there is no organized effort of human will, the completion of plutocracy is inevitable. Yet he admits that there are real difficulties in accepting socialism, and that socialists often neglect to answer them. Some of them he himself answers by insisting on the difference between the contemporary and the earlier types of socialism. "The modern socialist is not a communist." Money, as the medium of exchange, "is indispensable to human freedom." Posthumous property will persist in a mitigated state under socialism. "All that property which is an enlargement of personality, the modern socialist seeks to preserve." There will be no attempt to produce a dead level. On the contrary, society will be so ordered that there is free play for every kind of faculty, and reward will be proportioned, with more justice than at present, to merit.

These are important concessions. Yet we find it also laid

down that "socialism [by which I understand the socialist state] will be the universal landlord and the universal capitalist" (p. 147). Practically this appears to work out into general dependence for employment on the state or some municipality. When we are told that the kind of personal property necessary for freedom will still be left, is not this as if the new society were to try to retain the fruit while cutting the roots? The kind of *meum* and *tuum* which, as Mr. Wells points out, children spontaneously recognize, does not seem to be enough for the freedom of adults. The circumscription of spheres within a single household is an insufficient analogy for the developed state. Undoubtedly thinkers from opposite starting-points may considerably approximate to one another's positions. Mr. Wells I take to have been primarily a thinker of socialistic tendency. At an earlier stage (on record in his utopias) he seems to have regarded liberalism and democracy as superseded. Further development of his view has led him to see the extreme importance of providing for liberty and for democratic criticism in a socialistic state. On the other side it is a conspicuous fact of the time that liberalism admits more and more of what is called "socialistic legislation" as compatible with its principles. In their immediate aims liberals who desire movement and socialists who wish to achieve something in the present for the most part agree. For all that, there is a certain difference of ultimate ideal which it is better not to try to disguise. Mr. Wells's actual sketch of an ideal socialist order will in many respects not appeal to one who is primarily liberal or republican as distinguished from socialist. That socialism (with the state ultimately as universal landlord and universal capitalist) and plutocracy are the only logical alternatives I do not admit. To take them as such appears to me to result from trying to generalize an antithesis founded essentially on considerations only of the economic order. Mr. Wells, indeed, points out the limitations of purely economic theory, and notes how earlier socialists had already done this. Yet a close analysis, I think, would show that he has not altogether emerged from the circle in which most of the thinkers distinctively called socialist have moved. The communism of Plato or of More escapes this criticism, whatever may be said against it on other grounds.

Mr. Well's work is so suggestive of points to discuss that it

tempts the reviewer to go on indefinitely. Much might be said on the question whether a socialism which leaves so many things undecided can be "ultimately a moral and intellectual synthesis of mankind," even though it is added, "from which fresh growth may come." If we are to take certain limitations of conception as final, and not merely as part of the formulation of a compromise, then socialism is reduced entirely to a system of economic readjustments, and cannot claim to be a general synthesis at all. Is the form of the state, for example, indifferent? Is the expectation serious that popular religion will be much the same after as before the transition? If so, then I do not find the socialistic reorganization radical enough.

T. WHITTAKER.

London.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF RELIGION. A Series of Lectures by John Watson, M. A., LL. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in Queens University, Kingston, Canada. Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons. Pp. 485.

The lectures which constitute the body of this work are mainly essays in the reconstruction and history of religious belief. The author believes that "nothing short of a complete revision of current theological ideas can bring permanent satisfaction to our highly reflective age"; and "that the theology of the future must take the form of a philosophy of religion" (Preface.) This work is not, however, in the full sense, a philosophy of religion. There is no systematic inquiry as to what religion is, on what it depends and the place it occupies or should occupy in human life.

In the first chapter it is pointed out that religion contains three distinguishable but inseparable elements. It is at once a life, a creed and a ritual. Very little is said about ritual; the relation of life and creed is discussed at some length, and the contention is, that religion is a life nourished and sustained by beliefs which are fundamentally true. True beliefs must be capable of being formulated into a definite system of ideas; and the only reasonable basis of religion is a system of metaphysics. Professor Watson does not say, with Dr. McTaggart, that no man is justified in a religious attitude except as a result of metaphysical study. He agrees with Newman that the religious